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The Newfoundland and Labrador Seal Fishery; Where do we go from here?

Back to Issues, Campaigns and Projects

Effective Date: May 1, 2001

Fish, Food and Allied Workers (FFAW/CAW) represents more than 20,000 workers throughout Newfoundland and Labrador, most of whom are employed in the fishing industry. Many of our members in the fish harvesting sector also take part in the sealing industry.

Our Union welcomes this opportunity to present out views to the Independent Panel on Seal Management, appointed last year by the federal minister of fisheries and oceans to evaluate the current state of scientific knowledge and provide advice on a long-term strategy for the management of seal populations in Atlantic Canada.

Our presentation will briefly examine the history of the seal industry in the province, as well as address issues such as herd population size, seal predation, and management of the seal herd.

History

The seal fishery was firmly established as part of Newfoundland and Labrador coastal life by the early 1700s. In the beginning, seals were harvested with nets set from shore. By the late 18th century, Newfoundland and Labrador fish harvesters earned half their annual income from the sale of seal oil and skins.

The commercial offshore fishery got its start a little later, near the end of the 18th century, but the schooner fishing fleet did not play a significant role in the seal fishery until the early 1800s. Between 1825 and 1860, more than 300 schooners set sail from St. John's and Conception Bay with crews of 12,000 men or more. Eleven times during this 35-year period, catches of more than 500,000 pelts were landed with the maximum in 1832 when 744,000 seals were harvested. By 1850, the annual seal fishery was reported to be worth over $1 million to the economy of Newfoundland and Labrador.

By 1863, steamers were used for the first time in the offshore seal fishery and by 1911, all offshore sealing vessels were steam-powered. At the same time as the offshore seal fishery was taking place, smaller vessels also took part in the fishery. This was known as the landsmen harvest. These landsmen, from the Magdalen Islands, the North Shore of Quebec, and Newfoundland took part in the harvest from late December until May.

By the late 1800s, seal catches were beginning to decline. This decline continued into the 1900s. By 1970 annual catches averaged 270,000 animals. Quotas were introduced in 1971. By 1983, catches in Canadian waters had declined substantially as a result of a European ban on seal products. The sealing industry has been badly damaged because of trade barriers, and activities by animal rights' groups, which resulted in the European ban on sealing products. The United States has prohibited the import of seal products since 1972.

Since the early 1980s, the east coast seal fishery has struggled to rebuild. Quotas and catch rates have increased significantly as has seal abundance. The seal population -estimated by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans at 5.2 million animals - is nearly three times what it was in 1970, but the quota is about the same.

Even in recent years, the seal industry has had its share of ups and downs. For example, last year, despite an extended season, the TAC of 275,000 animals was only partially taken. Market conditions and high inventories, low prices, increased cost of fuel and boat insurance all contributed to a lacklustre sealing season.

Between 1983 and 1995, the average annual seal harvest was about 50,000 animals, despite a TAC of 186,000. But the market for seal products, especially seal skins improved after 1995. Given the growth of the harp seal herd over this period, the TAC was increased to 250,000 animals in 1996 and 275,000 in 1997. The TAC has remained at 275,000 animals since 1997.


The 1998 seal harvest was the largest in recent years with over 280,000 animals being taken. By 2000, poor market conditions contributed to just one third of the total allowable catch being harvested. Prices for pelts had fallen from $26 in 1998 to just $14 in 2000.

But the fact remains that Canada has the largest seal harvest in the world, most of which is based in Newfoundland and Labrador.

The Resource - the harp and hooded seal

Although hooded seals are also harvested in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and off northern Labrador and Newfoundland, the harp seal has been the mainstay of the sealing industry. Each spring, the vast ice floes off Labrador and the Gulf of St. Lawrence come alive with the arrival of adult female harp seals.

Harp seals owe their name to the irregular horseshoe-shaped band of black straddling the back of the adult male. Male harp seals are slightly larger than female harps. Weight ranges from 85 kg to 180 kg depending on the time of year.

The Northwest Atlantic harp seal population is divided into two herds: one breeding on the southward drifting Arctic pack ice off Southern Labrador (Front) and the other breeding on the ice in the Gulf of St. Lawrence near the Magdalen Islands (Gulf). Harp seals are harvested in both Canadian and Greenland waters.

Harp seals give birth, mate and moult on patches of ice. During January and February as the seals make their way towards Labrador and the northeast coast of Newfoundland, they are feeding intensively on caplin, herring, polar cod, shrimp and bottom-living fish such as cod, redfish, American plaice and Greenland halibut.


Pregnant seals give birth on winter pack ice in late February or early March. Newborn pups are about 85 cm long, weigh about 11 kg and are yellowish in colour. In three days the fur turns fluffy white, hence the name "whitecoats." Young harp seals are among the fastest growing of young mammals. They are nursed for about 12 days and then abandoned by their mothers. During this 12-day period, they will more than triple their weight.

After the harp pups are abandoned by their mothers, they begin to lose weight and to moult their white coats and are known as "ragged jackets." After the whitecoat is fully shed, it is replaced with a short silvery coat, flecked with dark spots. The seals are then known as "beaters."

Male harp seals reach maturity between 7 and 8 years, while females are generally mature between 4 and 6 years of age.

The hooded seal is much larger than the harp seal, reaching weights of between 200 and 400 kg. In Atlantic Canada, most hooded pups are born in March. They make up a minor part of the commercial and personal-use seal fishery. Fifteen-month-old hooded seals are known as "bluebacks" and are currently prohibited from catch as a result of a DFO regulatory change in 1999.

The Seal Population

The latest population estimates by DFO Science note the size of the harp seal herd had remained steady since 1996 at about 5.2 million animals. The 2000 and 2001 seal management plans noted that the harp seal herd is "healthy and abundant." The latest information on the hooded seal (1990) estimates its population at between 400,000 and 600,000 animals.


The harp seal population declined during the 1960s. By the early 1970s, the population has reached a low of less than two million. Since then the herd has more than doubled and while the population is said to have stabilized, it is currently at it highest level since population levels have been recorded (1960).

While the estimated population size is 5.2 million animals, scientists note that there is a 95% chance (Stock Status Report, 2000) that the range is between 4 million and 6.4 million seals.

Pup production of harp seals (results of aerial surveys) was estimated at one million in 1999. Pup production has been increasing since the early 1980s and throughout the 1990s, despite increased harvests.

Pregnancy rates for harp seals have varied since the 1950s as has the age at which females become sexually mature. According to the 2000 stock status report, in the 1950s female harp seals matured at 5.8 years. This decreased to 4.6 years in the 1980s and by the mid 1990s, it had increased again to 5.6 years.

Norwegian research indicates that "nature sets its own limits." (Norwegian Department of Fisheries) When a stock of animals is allowed to multiply virtually unchecked (as is the case with the harp seal herd since the 1980s), nature will sooner or later reach its "saturation point." As the number reaches this point, the animals' health will deteriorate, they will grow more slowly and will take longer to reach sexual maturity, their reproductive capabilities will be reduced and may be more likely to fall prey to disease. In addition, when a seal population becomes too large, they are forced to migrate long distances to find food which may explain why more and more seals are coming closer to shore and further south.

A Newfoundland fisheries department report (Winters, 2000) supported the Norwegian research when it determined that the harp seal herd is "reproductively stressed" because of the high population levels.

According to the Norwegian Department of Fisheries, in addition to their daily intake of caplin and herring, the huge seal populations are making major inroads into fish stocks which provide food for humans. For example, in the northeast Atlantic, harp seals eat as much herring as is caught by Norwegian fish harvesters.

Seal Predation

According to the 2000 harp seal stock status report, harp seals consume substantial amounts of prey in Canadian waters - a high percentage of which is fish. The report also notes (as does the 2001 Seal Management Plan) that commercial species make up only a small portion of a harp seal's total diet. Of course, given the harp seals are said to eat 3.3 million tonnes of food annually in the Northwest Atlantic (an increase from 2.5 million tonnes in 1990), even a small amount of commercial species (especially given the fragile state of some of these stocks) can have a significant impact on the status of these stocks.

In addition, we must keep in mind that the main food source for seals, who we know to be indiscriminate eaters, is caplin. Harp seals eat about one million tonnes of caplin a year. And while we recognize what the 2000 stock status report calls "the complex interactions within ecosystems," common sense tells us that the sheer amount of fish being consumed by seals must be having some impact on, for example, cod stocks which also depend on caplin for food and which are also a food source for seals.

The 2000 seal management plan estimated that harp seals consume about 90,000 tonnes of Atlantic cod annually. This number was revised in the 2001 management plan to 75,000 tonnes, with little explanation except to say that previous numbers had been too high and that the primary reason for the change was improved information on the diet and seasonal movements of harp seals.

The 2000 stock status report also notes that because of complex interactions within ecosystems, "it is not possible to quantify the impact this predation is having on the status of commercial fish stocks."

Yet examining the status of stocks such as cod and their biomass and factoring in the amount of cod consumed by seals should be enough to draw a sound conclusion that harp seals are having an impact and are hindering the recovery of some cod stocks.

In fact, the latest stock status report for northern cod has admitted that the abundant seal herd "may be" having an impact on cod stocks struggling to recover. The report estimates that harp seals consumed approximately 37,000 tonnes of northern cod last year and that predation by harp seals "may be preventing the recovery of the cod stock." The stock status report also revised earlier estimates of seal predation of northern cod. Originally, it was estimated that harp seals consumed 50,000 tonnes of northern cod in 1999 and 108,000 tonnes in 1998. The revised estimate from DFO science is that harp seals consumed about 37,000 tonnes (not 108,000 tonnes) in 1998. (In addition, according to Hammill and Stenson (2000), hooded seals removed just over 33,000 tonnes of northern cod in 1996.)

Ironically, while the northern cod stock status report states that seal predation may be having an impact on recovering cod stocks, it concludes that the small, commercial fishery is hindering or "will delay" stock recovery. It's no wonder fish harvesters continue to question science when harp seals consuming 37,000 tonnes of cod (five times as much as is taken in the commercial fishery) may be having an impact on cod stocks, yet the catch of 7,000 tonnes in a commercial harvest will delay rebuilding cod stocks.

The Northern Cod Stock Status Report also found that not only are harp seals travelling further south to feed on cod, they are also eating older fish which will impact on the future of the stock if seals continue to prey on cod of spawning age. From 1986 to 1996, cod up to one year old were the predominant age found in harp seal stomachs. In 1997 and 1998, older fish (aged 3-5 years) were the dominant age group and fish as old as age 7 were found in seal stomachs more frequently than in previous years. In addition, the report notes that the occurrence of harp seals is increasing in Trinity Bay, in the Smith Sound area - an area known for northern cod congregation and spawning.

This became even clearer this April when hundreds of seals were discovered in Smith Sound consuming large amounts of cod. Nuisance permits should be issued promptly by DFO fisheries officers in such cases.

Diet data from the inshore shows that per capita consumption of cod by harp seals has not declined with the collapse of the cod stock. In fact, in 1998 there was an increase in per capita consumption of cod by seals in the inshore, especially in winter. The stock status report also found that predation numbers may be higher since incidences of "belly-feeding" go undetected. This, the report says, may be an important source of cod mortality especially in the areas from White Bay to Bonavista Bay.

Despite the low abundance of cod in the 1990s, seal stomachs show more cod consumed, in total, during this period than in the 1980s. It is clear that harp seals are consuming far more northern cod and more cod in the northern Gulf of St. Lawrence than fish harvesters are catching. Gulf cod scientists have noted that consumption of cod by seals was a major source of mortality for cod in the 1990s.

Studies indicate that in 1996 harp seals in 4RS consumed anywhere between 22,000 tonnes and 42,000 tonnes of cod, while grey seals consumed 13,000 tonnes. Further studies indicate that harp seals ate nearly 25,500 tonnes of northern Gulf cod in 1999 or 133 million cod ages 0-2, plus 49 million cod ages 3-13 years.

Despite this research, the 2000 stock status report for 4RS3Pn cod concluded that "the estimate of cod predation by seals is too imprecise to be incorporated into the assessment." That's because incorporating the number of juvenile fish consumed by seals in the northern Gulf would mean a considerably higher spawning biomass than has been indicated by RV surveys.

Instead of including seal consumption in the analysis of Gulf cod, the natural mortality level was placed at twice the conventional value in order to take into account the additional mortality caused by seals. Despite all of this data, there is still an unwillingness to admit that seal predation in the northern Gulf (three to five times the commercial fishery) and off the northeast coast of Newfoundland is having an impact on cod stock recovery. Certainly, the panel in its interim report was unwilling to draw such a conclusion.

The fact that seals are eating more cod, even as cod abundance is said to be declining, is of grave concern and adds to the growing evidence that action must be taken to deal with the out-of-whack, predator-prey relationship that exists between seals and cod. In addition, while our Union does not agree with preliminary conclusions by this panel that "seals generally remove pre-recruits, which are intrinsically less important for recovery than the adults removed by fishing," we put forward the growing body of evidence that seals are no longer eating just pre-recruit cod. As was highlighted above, the consumption of older cod by seals is increasing, not to mention the problem of belly-feeding by seals.

Current estimates of seal consumption include a number of biases which may result in an underestimation of commercially important species being consumed by seals in Atlantic Canada.

Current methods rely on the presence of relatively undigested hard parts from prey which ignores the amount of predation resulting from seals eating the bellies of large fish. This could also result in a false presentation of the year classes being consumed by seals.

The panel is seeking to answer whether predation by seals is contributing to cod stocks remaining greatly depressed. There has been some modest recovery showing up in young fish, but fish disappear off the radar screen at age 5. This may be related to extensive belly-feeding by older seals.

The panel in its interim report notes that the predation of younger fish by seals will have a smaller influence on stock status because young fish must face additional years of mortality from all sources before they become mature. Yet the panel did point out that because a given weight of young fish will include far more individuals, this may then have more serious consequences than the removal of an equivalent weight of adults.

First of all, new studies indicate that seals are eating older fish in larger numbers. This is consistent with the first-hand experience of fish harvesters who have reported that seals eat the bellies from larger fish, although this may not show up in an analysis of a seal's diet. It is also consistent with the unexplained "disappearance" of cod beyond age 5 from DFO vessel surveys. In addition, we believe it is wrong and potentially dangerous to discount or marginalize the impact the removal of younger fish by seals is having on stock recovery and recruitment.

But the panel's interim report does this on page 42 when it states that "seals appear to take an overwhelming number of cod relative to humans. However, many of the fish consumed by seals are of ages that are subject to high mortality from other natural causes, whereas the limited fishery take is of actual or potentially reproductive cod."

This argument doesn't hold much water, especially when you consider the sheer numbers of cod being consumed by seals. For example, as noted in the panel's interim report, between 1993-1995 (Lilly et al, 1999) harp seals off eastern Newfoundland were estimated to have consumed an average of 552 million cod of all ages per year compared to the catch of just two million older fish by all gear types combined in 1998.

Despite these numbers and other estimates of seal predation of cod, the panel's preliminary conclusions ignore the impact the taking of pre-recruits by seals is having on cod stock recovery and recruitment - also a concern of the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council. As noted above, we disagree with the panel's conclusion that "seals generally remove pre-recruits which are intrinsically less important for recovery than the adults removed by fishing."

How do we know that the mass consumption of small fish (and the increasing consumption of older cod) by seals is not endangering recruitment? The arguments that seals can not be proven to have an impact on cod recovery are reminiscent of the argument made for many years by tobacco companies that their noxious products were not proven to cause human deaths.

The panel should consider advice from the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC) whose job it is to recommend measures considered necessary and appropriate for conservation purposes. In 1999 the FRCC issued a statement outlining its concerns over "burgeoning" seal herds. The Council noted that seals kill more cod from Canadian stocks (north of Halifax) than any other known factor.

"Seals are indisputably a key factor in reducing the recruitment of cod to the fishery... The FRCC is convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the conservation of groundfish stocks, most notably cod, will continue to be jeopardized if the seal herds remain at their current levels."

Our Union agrees with the FRCC position that seal herds can be sustainable at a reduced population level. The FRCC recommended that seal herds be reduced by up to 50% of their current population levels. We also believe that fish harvesters should not be the only ones subjected to the precautionary approach - which makes up one of the three key principles involved in DFO"s oceans' management strategy. The other two being sustainable development and integrated management planning.

The panel pointed out in its interim report that its final management recommendations will apply the "precautionary principle, risk management and other evolving approaches to the management of fish as well as seals." Our Union strongly urges the panel to consider the precautionary approach as it applies to unfettered consumption of cod and other slow-to-recover species by seals.

As stated in the Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review discussion document:

"Managing for conservation means taking elements of the ecosystem into account in decision-making, rather than just fish. It also calls for fisheries management plans that incorporate a precautionary approach - one that anticipates the possible calamities and includes contingency plans and remedies."

We urge the panel to "anticipate the possible calamities and include contingencies plans and remedies" with respect to seal predation.

The FRCC pointed out that in "applying the precautionary approach to groundfish management, action must be taken immediately in order to improve opportunities for the conservation and recovery of cod and other groundfish stocks, without waiting for absolute scientific proof of the effects of seal predation." This supports the precautionary approach as defined by the United Nations' Conference on Environment and Development which states "where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."

In its preliminary conclusions, the panel noted that "although attempts have been made to assess the impact of seal predation in an ecosystem context, it is not clear that the results of these analyses can be used to draw conclusions about the effects of seal predation on fish stocks in Atlantic Canada." Yet, if the panel was to follow the precautionary approach as established in the federal government's oceans strategy, we would not have to wait for "absolute scientific proof of the effects of seal predation" on cod stock recovery.

Indeed the Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review discussion document notes that "uncertainty is an intrinsic feature of managing a living resource" and that conservation means "avoiding unacceptable risks" to stocks and species. We submit that seal predation with respect to cod and other stocks such as Atlantic salmon poses an unacceptable risk and we can not wait until we have absolute scientific proof as such proof may never exist.

How much more data is needed to make such a conclusion? How many more years will we have to wait before enough research in this area is conducted? How many fish will seals have to consume and how big will the herd have to get before someone is willing to admit that seal predation is having an impact on cod stock recovery?

The Harvest.... Replacement yield versus sustainable level of harvest

Replacement yield refers to the number of seals that can be taken in a year without reducing the total population.

It does not address the question of what is a sustainable level of harvest. Not does it address what is a sustainable and appropriate herd size or what the panel refers to as an optimum herd size. An appropriate herd size has never been determined by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Is it two million harp seals as was the population in the 1970s? Is 5.2 million seals the desired population level or is it too high given the potential to hinder recovery of other fish stocks?

The current management regime for harp seals is based on the principle of replacement yield, which changes based on the size of the herd. According to Winters, in a report for the provincial Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, the replacement yield strategy is only appropriate when the regulated population has reached the "long-term management objective (and) in the case of harp seals there appears to be no long-term management objective with respect to desired population levels."

According to the interim report prepared by this panel, the aim of the current management approach for northwest Atlantic harp seals is to "achieve a sustainable harvest that allows the seal population to maintain its numbers by setting a total allowable catch that is less than the calculated replacement yield."

Unfortunately, the current management approach is faulty as it maintains a seal population of 5.2 million animals (even when you take into account the Canadian and Greenland harvests) when it hasn't been determined whether this is an appropriate herd size.

The panel also points out that market trends combined with the withdrawal of government financial support for the sealing industry suggest that the harvest of harp seals may continue to fall short of the replacement yield, resulting in continued population growth.

The question becomes if the panel concludes that a lower population level for harp seals is "a desirable policy objective" then new initiatives will be necessary to promote a higher level of harvesting. What should those initiatives be?

First, we need to identify the target population and a strategy to meet that target in a defined time frame. We recommend the target should be the average population size of the last 40 years since population levels have been estimated. Currently, the management measure of replacement yield is not working as the target population keeps increasing.

Secondly, seal resource managers need a plan or strategy when harvests fall short of the TAC because of factors such as poor market conditions, ice conditions or increased harvesting costs. In any of these cases, the stock may expand beyond the target level established. Resource managers need to understand the reasons why harvests levels may fall short and be able to come up with alternative measures to meet the target level. Government must also be willing to make adjustments, such as increased quotas in future years to compensation for past poor harvests levels. In other words adding the shortfall in catch from one year to the TAC in the following year.

Science... funding for research cut in half

Our Union has heavily criticized the federal government for its major cuts to the department of fisheries and oceans' science budget. It's a clear case of knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing. These cuts have happened at a time (declining groundfish stocks, increased offshore oil activity) when science budgets required a massive infusion of funding. Seal research, as was pointed out by the panel in its interim report, was not left unscathed. In fact, funding for seal research was cut by more than 50% between 1998 and 2000, decreasing from just over $1 million a year to $550,000 annually.

How can we get answers to the very serious questions being raised with respect to seal predation and its impact on the recovery of fish stocks when the budgets for such work have been slashed in half? At this rate we will never be able "to draw conclusions about the effects of seal predation on fish stocks in Atlantic Canada." Of course, the question remains: How much research do we need before direct action can be taken?

While our Union supports the need for more research, we do not believe we have to wait for such research to be conducted before action can be taken. The current body of research and evidence is sufficient to support bold action.

In the meantime it should be pointed out that one area that has lacked research is the impact seal population is having on the recovery of Atlantic salmon stocks. As noted by the panel in its interim report, even if harp seals consumed 100% of the annual post-smolt production by North American salmon, this would only make up 0.09% of the seals diet. This is certainly an area that needs more attention.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Our Union recommends that the panel take bold measures to deal with the growing problem of seal predation of slow-to-recover fish stocks.

We can not afford to wait for absolute proof or years for more research results. We must accept that "uncertainty is an intrinsic feature of managing a living resource." (AFPR, 2001)

FFAW/CAW recommends that a target population (average herd size over last 40 years) be established and that a reasonable time frame to achieve that population be imposed.

We recognize that reaching the target population may require outside help. Once a target population is set along with a time frame for getting there, if our seal industry is unable to market the target level of removals Canada should be prepared to allocate quota (to be re-evaluated each year) to foreign countries such as Russia for domestic use of the animals outside the traditional markets. In addition, a shortfall in harvest levels in one year must be applied to the TAC in the following year.

We recommend that the precautionary approach be taken into account and applied not just to fish harvesters as it has been, but to seals.

While these measures are underway, research can also be taking place. The key is that these recommendations can not - and must not - be put on hold until the research is conducted.

We recommend that sealers take part in that research forming a partnership with science similar to what we've seen in the sentinel fishery. In this case, sealers can help DFO science gather data and take part in the overall research program.

We recommend research in the following areas:

1. A new estimate of the hooded seal population must be undertaken immediately;

2. An examination of the impact the harp seal herd is having on the recovery of the northern and Gulf cod as well as Atlantic salmon stocks;

3. The issue of belly-feeding needs further examination as does the whole matter of the seal herd being under stress and travelling further south for food;

4. The very real impact of seal predation on stock recruitment deserves a lot more attention, especially as it is being used as a reason for underestimating the impact small fish removal is having on stock recruitment;

FFAW/CAW also recommends that the federal and provincial governments put in place a policy to deal with the horrendous insurance costs being charged to sealers. For example, in any other fishery, an owner-operator may be charged a $2,000 insurance deductable. Insurance companies are charging a $100,000 deductable in the case of the seal fishery. This is not only harsh, but prevents many (especially small boat fish harvesters) from taking part in the seal fishery.

Finally, this panel must categorically state that seal predation is impacting cod stock recovery. Anything less is to ignore the evidence and first-hand knowledge of fish harvesters.


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